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Introduction
Recently, the dynamic optimization of (linear) large-population system has attracted extensive research attentions from academic communities. Its most significant feature is the existence of numerous insignificant agents, denoted by {A i } N i=1 , whose dynamics and (or) cost functionals are coupled via their state-average. To design lowcomplexity strategies for large-population system, one efficient method is mean-field game (MFG) which enables us to derive the decentralized strategies. Interested readers may refer to Lasry and Lions (2007) , Guéant et al. (2010) for the motivation and methodology, and Andersson and Djehiche (2011) , Bardi (2012) , Bensoussan et al. (2016) , Buckdahn et al. (2009a Buckdahn et al. ( , 2009b Buckdahn et al. ( , 2010 Buckdahn et al. ( , 2011 , Carmona and Delarue (2013) , Huang et al. (2006 Huang et al. ( , 2007 Huang et al. ( , 2012 , Li and Zhang (2008) for recent progress of MFG theory. Our work is to consider the following large-population system involving a major agent A 0 and minor agents {A i } N i=1 :
and minor agent A i :
⎧ ⎨ ⎩ dx i (t) = Ax i (t)+ Bu i (t) + Dx (N) (t) + αx 0 (t) dt + σ dW i (t),
where
x i (t) is state-average of all minor agents. Moreover, A 0 and {A i } 1≤i≤N can be further coupled via their cost functionals J 0 , J i as follows: 
(T ) .
Formal assumptions on coefficients of states and costs will be given later. As addressed in (Carmona and Delarue 2013) and (Nourian and Caines 2013) , the standard procedure of MFG (without A 0 ) mainly consists of the following steps: ( Step i) Fix the state-average limit: lim N−→+∞ x (N) by a frozen processx and formulate an auxiliary stochastic control problem for A i which is parameterized byx.
(
Step ii) Solve the above auxiliary stochastic control problem to obtain the decentralized optimal statex i (which should depend on the undetermined processx, hence denoted byx i (x)).
(Step iii) Determinex by the fixed-point argument:
As to the MFG with major-minor agent (A 0 , A i ), Step (ii) can be further divided into: ( Step ii-a) First, solve the decentralized control problem for A 0 by replacing x (N) usingx. The related decentralized optimal state is denoted byx 0 (x) and optimal control byū 0 (x).
Step ii-b) Second, givenx 0 (x) andū 0 (x) of A 0 , solve the auxiliary stochastic control problem for A i . The related decentralized statesx i for A i should depend on (x,x 0 (x)), hence denoted byx i (x,x 0 (x) ).
(Step iii) is thus revised to fixed-point argument:
The MFG with major-minor agent has been extensively studied: for example, Huang (2010) discussed MFG with a major agent and heterogenous minor agents parameterized by finite K classes; Nguyen and Huang (2012) further considered MFG with heterogenous minor agents parameterized by a continuum index set; Nourian and Caines (2013) studied MFG for nonlinear large population system involving major-minor agents; Buckdahn et al. (2014) discussed the MFG with major-minor agents in weak formulation where the "feedback control against feedback control" strategies are studied.
The modeling novelty of this paper, is to consider a major-minor agent system with backward major, namely, the state of A 0 satisfies a backward stochastic differential equation (BSDE):
Unlike forward SDE with given initial condition x 0 , the terminal condition ξ is pre-specified in BSDE as a priori and its solution becomes an adapted process pair (x 0 , z 0 ). The linear BSDEs were first introduced by Bismut (1978) and the general nonlinear BSDE was first studied in Pardoux and Peng (1990) . The BSDE has been applied broadly in many fields such as mathematical economics and finance, decision making and management science. One example is the representation of stochastic differential recursive utility by a class of BSDE (Duffie and Epstein (1992) , El Karoui et al. (1997) , Wang and Wu (2009), etc.) . A BSDE coupled with a SDE in their terminal conditions formulates the forward-backward stochastic differential equation (FBSDE) . The FBSDE has also been well studied and the interested readers may refer Antonelli (1993) , Cvitanić and Ma (1996) , Hu and Peng (1995) , Ma et al. (1994 Ma et al. ( , 2015 , Ma and Yong (1999) , Peng and Wu (1999) , Wu (2013) , Yong (1997 Yong ( , 2010 , Yong and Zhou (1999) , Yu (2012) and the references therein for more details of FBSDEs.
The modeling of major agent by BSDE and minor agents by forward SDE, is well motivated and can be illustrated by the following example. In a natural resource exploitation industry, there exist a large number of small exploitation firms
which are more aggressive in their business activities. Accordingly, their cost functionals are based on forward SDEs with given initial conditions. Here, these initial conditions can be interpreted as their initial investments or deposits for exploitation licenses. On the other hand, the major agent A 0 acts as some dominating administration party such as local government or regulation bureau. As the administrator, A 0 is more conservative hence its state can be modeled by a linear BSDE for which the terminal condition is specified. Such terminal condition can be interpreted as a future target or objective such as tax revenue from exploitation industry, or environmental protection index related to natural resource.
The modeling of backward-major and forward-minors will yield a largepopulation system with backward-forward stochastic differential equation (BFSDE), which is structurally different to FBSDE in the following aspects. First, the forward and backward equations will be coupled in their initial instead terminal conditions. Second, unlike FBSDE, there is no feasible decoupling structure by the standard Riccati equations, as addressed in Lim and Zhou (2001) . This is mainly because some implicit constraints in initial conditions should be satisfied in the possible decoupling.
The introduction of BFSDE also brings some technical differences to its MFG studies. First, as addressed in (Step i), the state-average limit of minor agents will be frozen. Then, by (ii-a), the optimal state of major agent should follow a BFSDE system. This is because the major state follows some BSDE, thus its adjoint process should be a forward SDE. These two equations will be further coupled in their initial conditions. Therefore, we will get some BFSDE instead the classical FBSDE from standard forward major-forward minor MFG. Next, as suggested by (ii-b), the given minor agent will solve some optimal control problem with augmented state: its own state, state-average limit, optimal state of major agent from (ii-a), which is a BFSDE. The minor agent's optimal control should involve some feedback of this augmented state. In this way, the minor's optimal state will be represented through some coupled system of its own state, the major's agent, the state-average limit as well as one inhomogeneous equation (which is another BSDE because the state-average limit depends on major's agent, thus it should be a random process in general). Last, as specified in (iii), taking summation of all individual minor agents' states should reduce to the state-average limit frozen in (i). Consequently, more complicated consistency condition system should be derived in our current backward major-forward minor setup.
Based on the above step scheme, the related mean-field LQG games for backwardmajor and forward-minor system will be proceeded rather differently, comparing to the standard MFG analysis for forward major-minor systems. In particular, the decentralized strategies for major and minor agents will be based on a new consistency condition (see our analysis in Section "The limiting optimal control and NCE equation system"). Accordingly, a stochastic process which relates to state of major player is introduced here to approximate the state-average. An auxiliary mean-field SDE and a 3 × 2 FBSDE system are introduced and analyzed. Here, the 3 × 2 FBSDE, which is also called a triple FBSDE, comprises three forward and three backward equations. Applying the monotonic method in Peng and Wu (1999) and Yu (2012) , we obtain the wellposedness of this FBSDE. In addition, the decoupling of backward-forward SDE using Riccati equation is also different to that of standard forward-backwards SDE. The -Nash equilibrium property of decentralized control strategy with = O(1/ √ N) is also derived. The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section "Preliminaries and problem formulation" formulates the large population LQG games of backward-forward systems. In Section "The limiting optimal control and NCE equation system", the limiting optimal controls of the track systems and consistency conditions are derived.
Section " -Nash equilibrium analysis" is devoted to the related -Nash equilibrium property. "Conclusion and future work section" serves as a conclusion to our study.
Preliminaries and problem formulation
Throughout this paper, we denote by R m the m-dimensional Euclidean space. Consider a finite time horizon [0, T ] for a fixed T > 0. Suppose ( , F, {F t } 0≤t≤T , P ) is a complete filtered probability space on which a standard Consider a large population system with (1 + N) individual agents, denoted by A 0 and {A i } 1≤i≤N , where A 0 stands for the major player, while A i stands for i th minor player. For sake of illustration, we restate the states of major-minor agents as follows, and give the necessary assumptions on coefficients. The dynamics of A 0 is given by a BSDE as follows:
is the state-average of minor players; x i0 is the initial
which is the full information accessible to the large population system up to time t. Let U i , i = 0, 1, 2, . . . , N be subsets of R. The admissible control strategy u 0 ∈ U 0 , u i ∈ U i , where
and
Remark 2.1 Unlike (Huang 2010 , Nguyen and Huang 2012 , Nourian and Caines 2013 Espinosa and Touzi (2015) , where the relative performance is formulated by some convex combination
This functional combination can be interpreted as some balance between the minimization of its own cost and the benchmark index tracking to the minor agents' average. Moreover, such tracking can be framed into the relative performance setting. Similar work can be found in
We introduce the following assumption:
are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) with Ex i0 = x, E|x i0 | 2 < +∞, and also independent of {W 0 , W i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N}.
It follows that (1) admits a unique solution for all u 0 ∈ U 0 , (see Pardoux and Peng (1990) ). It is also well known that under (H1), (2) admits a unique solution for all u i ∈ U i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N. Now, we formulate the large population dynamic optimization problem.
Problem (I). Find a control strategies setū
= (ū 0 ,ū 1 , · · · ,ū N ) which satisfies J i (ū i (·),ū −i (·)) = inf u i ∈U i J i (u i (·),ū −i (·)), 0 ≤ i ≤ N, whereū −0 represents (ū 1 ,ū 2 , · · · ,ū N ) andū −i represents (ū 0 ,ū 1 , · · · ,ū i−1 , u i+1 , · · · ,ū N ), for 1 ≤ i ≤ N.
The limiting optimal control and NCE equation system
Combining the major's state with forcing equation (BSDE with null terminal condition), we naturally have the following formulation of limit representation. To obtain the feedback control and the desired results, we assume
Introduce the following auxiliary dynamics of major and minor players, still denoted by
Note that the coefficients (Ā(·),B(·),C(·),Ã(·),B(·),C(·))
∈ L 2 (0, T ; R 6 ) are still to be determined. The associated limiting cost functionals becomē
Thus, we formulate the limiting LQG game (II) as follows.
Problem (II). For i th agent
u i satisfying (9) is called an optimal control for (II). To get the optimal control of Problem (II), we should obtain the optimal control of A 0 first. We have the following lemma.
Remark 3.1 Sincex(t) is regarded as the approximated process of state average x (N) (t), we replace x (N) (t) byx(t) in Problem (II). In what follows, (II) is called the limiting problem of (I) as
Lemma 3.1 Corresponding to the forward-backward system (5) and (7), the optimal control of A 0 for (II) is given bȳ
where the adjoint process p 0 (·) and the corresponding optimal trajectory
, introduce the following variational equations:
(12) Applying Itô's formula to p 0 (t)δx 0 (t) + p(t)δx(t) + q(t)δk(t) and noting the associated first-order variation of cost functional:
we obtain the optimal control (10). Combining all state equations and adjoint equations, and applyingū 0 (·) to A 0 , we get the Hamilton system (11).
After obtaining the optimal control of major player A 0 , in what follows we aim to get the optimal controlū i of minor player A i , with corresponding optimal trajectorŷ x i (·).
Lemma 3.2 Under (H1), the optimal control of A i for (II) is
where the adjoint process p i (·) and the corresponding optimal trajectoryx i (·) satisfy BSDE dp i (
Here
, andx(·) are given by (11). The proof is similar to that of Lemma 3.1 and omitted. For the coupled BFSDE (14) and (15), we are going to decouple it and try to derive the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) system satisfied by the decentralized control policy. Then we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3.3 Suppose P (·) is the unique solution of the following Riccati equation
then we obtain the following Hamilton system:
where P i (·), f i (·) are to be determined. Here, P i (·) is differentiable and f i (·) is an Itô process. The terminal condition p i (T ) = Hx i (T ) implies that
Comparing the coefficients with (14), we get θ i (t) = σ P i (t),
Noting that Riccati Eq. (18) is symmetric, it is well known that (18) admits a unique nonnegative bounded solution P i (·) (see (Ma and Yong 1999) ). Further we get
where x i (·) is the state of minor player A i . Plugging (20) into (2) implies the centralized closed-loop state:
Taking the summation, dividing by N, and letting N → +∞, we get
Comparing the coefficients with the second equation of (5), we havē
Then we obtain
Noting the third equation of (5), it follows that
Then (17) is obtained, which completes the proof.
Remark 3.4 The proof of Lemma 3.3 implies that k(·) = f (·). Thus, k(·), which is first introduced in (5), has some specific meaning that it is indeed a force function when decoupling (14) and (15).
To get the wellposedness of (17), we give the following assumption.
Theorem 3.1 Under (H2), FBSDE (17) is uniquely solvable.
Proof Uniqueness. It is easily checked that (16) admits a unique nonnegative bounded solution (see (Ma and Yong 1999) ). For the sake of notational convenience, in (17) we denote by b(φ), σ (φ) the coefficients of drift and diffusion terms, respectively, for φ = p 0 ,x, q; denote by f (ψ) the generator for ψ =x 0 , p, k.
Define := (p 0 ,x, q,x 0 , p, k,ẑ 0 ,θ, θ 0 ), similar to the notation in (Peng and Wu 1999) , we denote by
Then for any
In the following, we are first going to show that (17) admits at most one adapted solution. Suppose and
and applying Itô's formula to p 0 ,x 0 + x ,p + q,k , we have
It follows that
By (H2), we get β 1 > 0 and β 2 > 0. Thenp 0 (s) ≡ 0,x 0 (s) ≡ 0. Further z 0 (s) ≡ 0. Applying the basic technique tox(s) andk(s), and using Gronwall's inequality, we obtainx(s) ≡ 0,k(s) ≡ 0 andθ 0 (s) ≡ 0. Similarly, we haveq(s) ≡ 0, p(s) ≡ 0, andθ(s) ≡ 0. Therefore, (17) admits at most one adapted solution.
Existence. In order to prove the existence of the solution, we first consider the following family of FBSDEs parameterized by γ ∈ [0, 1]:
0 , P ; R). Clearly, when γ = 1, the existence of (23) implies that of (17). When γ = 0, it is easy to obtain that (23) admits a unique solution (actually, the 2-dim FBSDE is very similar to the Hamiltonian system of (Lim and Zhou 2001) ).
If, a priori, for each
) and a certain number γ 0 ∈ [0, 1) there exists a unique tuple (p (23), then for each
there exists a unique tuple
In the following, we aim to prove that the mapping defined by
Applying Itô's formula to P 0 ,X 0 + X ,P + Q ,K , we have
On the other hand, since P 0 and P 0 are solutions of SDEs with Itô's type, applying the usual technique, the estimate for the differenceP 0 = P 0 − P 0 is obtained by
(26) Similarly, estimates for the differenceX =X −X andQ = Q − Q are given by
respectively, for ∀0 ≤ r ≤ T . In the same way, for the difference of the solutions
, applying the usual technique to the BSDEs, we have
Here the constant C 1 depends on the coefficients of (1)- (2), P (·), β 1 , β 2 , and
Under (H2), combining (25), (27)- (28), (30)- (31), and applying Gronwall's inequality, we obtain
where C 2 depends on C 1 , μ, and T.
, we get that for each fixed δ ∈ [0, δ 0 ], the mapping I γ 0 +δ is a contraction in the sense that
Then it follows that there exists a unique fixed point
which is the solution of (23) for γ = γ 0 + δ. Since δ 0 depends only on (C 1 , μ, T ), we can repeat this process N times with 1 ≤ Nδ 0 < 1 + δ 0 . Then it follows that, in particular, as γ = 1 corresponding to ϕ i t ≡ 0, λ t ≡ 0, κ i t ≡ 0, a = 0 (i = 1, 2, 3), (23) admits a unique solution, which implies the wellposedness of (17) (also (11)). The proof is complete. (Huang 2010 , Huang et al. 2007 , Huang et al. 2006 ). By Theorem 3.1, we know that there exists a unique 9-tuple solution (p 0 ,x, q,x 0 , p, k,ẑ 0 ,θ, θ 0 ) which can be obtained off-line. Thus, it is equivalent with the fixed-point principle. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to focus on the well-posedness of coupled FBSDE in large population problems.
Remark 3.5 In what follows, (17) is called the Nash certainty equivalence (NCE) equation system (see

-Nash equilibrium analysis
In above sections, we obtained the optimal controlū i (·), 0 ≤ i ≤ N of Problem (II) through the consistency condition system. Now, we turn to verify the -Nash equilibrium of Problem (I). To start, we first present the definition of -Nash equilibrium.
Definition 4.1 A set of controls
u k ∈ U k , 0 ≤ k ≤ N, for (N + 1
) agents is called to satisfy an -Nash equilibrium with respect to the costs
when any alternative control u i ∈ U i is applied by A i . If = 0, then Definition 4.1 is reduced to the usual Nash equilibrium. Now, we state the main result of this paper and its proof will be given later. (H1)-(H2), (ũ 0 ,ũ 1 ,ũ 2 , · · · ,ũ N ) satisfies the -Nash equilibrium of (I). Here,ũ 0 is given bỹ
Theorem 4.1 Under
wherex i (·), the state trajectory for A i , satisfies (21).
The proof of above theorem needs several lemmas which are presented later. Denote by (x 0 (·),z 0 (·)) the centralized state trajectory; (x 0 (·),ẑ 0 (·)) the decentralized one. Applyingũ 0 (·) to A 0 and using the notations above, it is easy to know that
which is determined by h 3 (·). The cost functionals for (I) and (II) are given by
respectively. For A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N, we have the following closed-loop system
with the cost functional
The auxiliary system (limiting problem) is given by
where (x(t)x 0 , k(t)x 0 ) satisfies (17). We have
Proof By (37), we have
by (17) and Gronwall's inequality, we obtain (41).
It is easy to get that sup 0≤t≤T E x 0 (t) −x(t)x 0 2 < +∞. Applying the CauchySchwarz inequality, we have
(43) In addition, by (10) and (33), we haveũ 0 (·) =û 0 (·). Thus, (42) 
Proof For ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ N, applying Gronwall's inequality, we get (44) from (41), (37) and (39). (45) follows from (44) and (34) 
2 < +∞, we obtain (46).
Until now, we have studied some estimates of states and costs corresponding to controlũ i andū i , 0 ≤ i ≤ N. Next, we will focus on the -Nash equilibrium for (I). Consider a perturbed control u 0 ∈ U 0 for A 0 and introduce the dynamics
whereas minor players keep the controlũ i ,
where l (N) 
And for any fixed i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N, consider a perturbed control u i ∈ U i for A i , whereas the major and other minor players keep the controlũ
where m (N) 
Ifũ j , 0 ≤ j ≤ N is an -Nash equilibrium with respect to cost J j , it holds that
Then, when making the perturbation, we just need to consider u j ∈ U j such that
In the limiting cost functionalJ j , by the optimality of (x j ,ū j ), we get that (x j ,ū j ) is L 2 -bounded. Then we obtain the boundedness ofJ j (ū j ), i.e.,
where C 3 is a positive constant and independent of N. Then we have the following proposition. 
From (50) and (51), it holds that
Here, C 4 and C 5 are both positive constants. 
Thus, for any 1
E|l k (t)| 2 and sup 0≤t≤T
E|m k (t)| 2 are bounded.
Hence the result.
Correspondingly, the dynamics for agent A 0 under control u 0 for (II) is as follows
and for agent
where 
Proof From (47) and (53), by the existence and uniqueness of BSDE, for the same perturbed control u 0 (·), we have (l 0 , q 0 ) = (l 0 , q 0 ). Further, noting FBSDE (49) and (55)
Noting (55) and
and applying Gronwall's inequality, we get (56). Using the same technique as Lemma 4.1 and noting sup 0≤t≤T E l 0 (t) −x(t) l 0 2 < +∞, we obtain (57).
Now, we will focus on the difference of states and cost functionals for the perturbed control and optimal control of minor agents. Given the system of A i under control u i for (II) 
wherem ( 
Proof From (62)- (63), applying Proposition 4.1 and Gronwall's inequality, the assertion (64) 
Proof (67) follows from Proposition 4.2 directly. From (50) and (58), we get (68) by applying (67). Further, we have
which implies (69).
Proof of Theorem 4.1: Now, we consider the -Nash equilibrium for A 0 and A i , 1 ≤ i ≤ N. Combining (42) and (57), we have
It follows from (46) and (69) that
Thus, Theorem 4.1 follows by taking = O 1 √ N .
